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Is the institutionalization of religious freedom through human rights ju-
risprudence simply a means by which the modern nation-state manufac-
tures and regulates “religion”? Is the discourse of religious freedom
principally a technology of state governance? These questions challenge
the ways that scholars conceptualize the relation between states, national-
ism, human rights, and religious freedom. This article forwards an ap-
proach to human rights and methodological nationalism that both
counters and explores alternatives to the prevailing conceptions of
human rights, nationalism, and state sovereignty in the discourse on the
putative impossibility—and, by some accounts, insidiousness—of reli-
gious freedom. I first explicate the interpretive and contestatory dimen-
sions of human rights discourse concerning religious freedom. I then
explore cross-cutting ambivalences within the nationalisms that states
need and cultivate in effort to transmute their monopoly upon coercive
force (i.e. power) into legitimated authority. I argue that these provide
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two dimensions in and through which state sovereignty may be opposed,
criticized, held accountable, and subject to change.
IN MULTIPLE CASES ACROSS EUROPE, a growing list of rulings
by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) converges on an appar-
ent consensus: the expanding presence of Islam throughout Europe pre-
sents a pronounced challenge to Western conceptions of secular law and
human rights. Several analysts have argued that behind this apparent con-
sensus lurk various strains of European nationalism (Asad 2003: chap. 5;
Asad 2006; Scott 2007; Bowen 2012). These nationalisms manifest ten-
dencies to reify the identity of an internally distinct yet putatively inassi-
milable “other.” They then, in effect, scapegoat that other—in the present
cases, through the socio-cultural, political, legal, and religious construc-
tion of Islamophobia (Springs 2015).
The most conspicuous strains of European nationalisms take form in
unapologetically xenophobic, chauvinistic, self-identified nationalist
voices. This poses a deceptive complication for understanding and ade-
quately responding to nationalist reactions to Muslims in Europe. It is il-
lusorily straightforward to limit one’s conception of nationalism to its
most extreme manifestations, such as abhorrently radical fringe elements
(e.g. the case of Anders Breivik in Norway), political groups that clearly
deviate from the politics of the mainstream (e.g. Marine Le Pen and the
National Front Party in France), self-avowedly less extreme but nonethe-
less vocally xenophobic public figures (e.g. the legacy of Pim Fortuyn and
politics of Geert Wilders in Holland), or those who declare that Islam’s
increasingly visible presence in Europe vindicates the inexorability of
Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis (e.g. Ayaan Hirsi Ali).
The attention commanded by such pronounced examples draws attention
away from forms and effects of nationalism that interpose themselves in
the reaction to Muslims in Europe in less conspicuous ways. The latter
occur more subtly, at times surreptitiously, as modes of exclusion, inequal-
ity, and humiliation. And these may crop up within even the languages
and norms that have been developed to protect against nationalism’s more
egregious effects.
What options are available for illuminating and protecting against
effects of nationalism when, for instance, nationalist strains of
Islamophobia become subtly articulated and enforced in the application
of human rights norms and institutions? It is this question to which the
following paper poses an answer. I examine the 2004 law banning the
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wearing of conspicuous religious symbols in contemporary France,
taking as a test case the ECHR upholding that ban in 2008 in Dogru v.
France (ECHR 2008). I argue that international human rights norms and
institutions, while insufficient alone, are nonetheless indispensable for
protecting against the encroachment of subtle forms of religious national-
ism and for the protection of religious freedom in contemporary
European contexts. I propose to illuminate and then critically assess the
ways that human rights discourse (and recent adjudications by the
ECHR, in particular) has come to subtly collude in anti-Muslim currents
of European nationalism. At the same time, my critical exposition aims
to lead to a refined understanding of the constructive roles that human
rights might play in European contexts. I seek to demonstrate that
human rights discourse can be, and needs to be, applied in conjunction
with analytical tools that guard against its unjust applications.
Part I of this paper places my engagement with the French headscarf
law and ECHR ruling within the context of recent debates over human
rights and religious freedom. These debates question the viability and/or
incapacity for human rights adjudication regarding religious freedom
to cut against the influence of Islamphobic tendencies inscribed in
European state interests. Yet these debates, I argue, are prone to excessive
discursive analytical tendencies. They risk concluding that human rights,
and religious freedom more specifically, serve (however tacitly) purely as
means by which modern states impose and reinforce the regulatory
powers of their sovereignty (as tentacles of the Leviathan, one might
say).1 I unpack the case at hand, examining how the banning of head-
scarves in French public schools relied upon quite specific conceptions of
French national identity and French state sovereignty. I then examine the
abortive effort to challenge the headscarf ban on the basis of human
rights norms as codified in the “freedom of religious expression clause” of
Article Nine of the ECHR (ECHR 2008). Article Nine appears to directly
counter the ban’s legal justifiability. On what grounds did the ECHR ap-
plication of principles of freedom of conscience and religious expression
as codified in Article Nine—ultimately justify upholding the ban on reli-
gious symbolic dress in public spaces? Answers to this question become
available, I argue in part II, only when one includes the influence of na-
tional culture, and particularly the impact of the laic ethos of French
society as a form of ethno-religious nationalism, in assessing this case.
Attending to the subtle dynamics of French religious nationalism
1The language of the state as a Leviathan is not hyperbolic on my part; it is invoked by some
among the critics I address (see, e.g., Mahmood and Danchin 2014a: 8).
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illuminates tendencies toward a secularist cultural hegemony in the
current ECHR ruling. Within this hegemony, the valorization of human
rights (and application of the “conscience clause” itself ) ultimately comes
to perpetuate forms of social exclusions, inequality, and humiliation.
The purpose of my critical analysis, however, is to forward a corrective
approach to human rights. Such an approach aims to enrich and alter it
as a normative discourse by illuminating its inevitably political and cul-
tural dimensions. Such an approach factors into its analyses the context-
specific interests and purposes that inevitably influence adjudication of
human rights cases. The results of attending to nationalism, I argue in
part III, do not necessitate abandoning or vilifying human rights as in-
exorable tools of state power dressed in nationalist trappings. I propose,
rather, to reconceptualize nationalism as interdependent with, and yet
simultaneously distinguishable from, state purposes and interests. This
permits recognizing the multiplicity of ways that, in practice, processes of
selective cultural and religious negotiation constitute national identities
and associations. These might afford multidirectional resources for im-
manent critical resistance to, and imagining constructive transformation
of, state interests and human rights applications.
WHAT’S WRONGWITH RIGHTS? HOW THE STATE
MANUFACTURES AND REGULATES RELIGION
THROUGH THE DISCOURSE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM,
AND THE LIMITS OF CRITIQUE
To maintain the indispensability of human rights by subjecting them to
reflexive analysis is to enter squarely into recent debates over the viability of
human rights to actually serve the purposes that they purport to serve in
the first place. A wave of recent scholars deploying genealogical and power
analyses address secularization and religious freedom in contemporary
Europe. Several of these analyses help illuminate how nationalism influenc-
es the marginalization of Muslims in Europe through state laws and human
rights adjudications. At the same time, they tend to diagnose these influ-
ences as symptomatic of the intrinsic deficiency of human rights. The influ-
ence of nationalism in these cases is symptomatic of the fact that human
rights are implements of domination by the modern state.2
2For one especially influential argument along these lines, see Asad 2003: chaps. 4–5. I engage
several scholars whose work is influenced by, or roughly concurs with, Asad’s position throughout
the sections that follow. Of course, positions that challenge human rights as a discourse by which
nation-states manufacture their power take a wide array of forms. The space of this article is
inadequate to consider all of them—or even a representative sampling—nor is that my purpose here.
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While these accounts vary in their details, they converge on the claim
that human rights provide essential means by which the state consolidates
and expands its sovereignty. It does this, in part, through defining basic
conceptions of “the human” and “religion.” “Human rights” designate, in
the former case, what does and does not qualify for protection as rightful-
ly human. In the latter case, they designate which aspects of religion do
and do not qualify for protection by the state (e.g. which practices, identi-
ties, and institutions qualify for protection of their “religious freedom,”
which must be excluded, and which features of religion are permitted—
by the state— to claim some exemption from state interference).
The expanding presence of Islam in Europe presents an especially in-
structive case study. Among other points of contention, some have argued,
the alleged in-assimilability of Islamic conceptions of personhood to a
Western conception of persons as self-possessing, self-determining,
choosing subjects marginalizes Muslims in Europe. The friction generat-
ed between these contrasting conceptions of human personhood unmasks
human rights as a manifestation of neo-liberal ideology. On this account,
human rights provide a set of terms by which sovereign nation-states and
international rights institutions determine when individuals’ freedoms
are enforceable and when they may be abrogated.
Human rights present purportedly ethical, even humanitarian, pro-
tections of the generically “human.” In reality, however, these are pivotal
means by which nation-states both produce and regulate their citizens as
subjects. Moreover, some argue, in violence-torn international contexts,
when human rights are invoked as protections against, or bases for inter-
vening in, mass atrocity (e.g. ethnic cleansing, genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and so on), human rights claims and institutions
actually operate covertly as putatively apolitical humanitarian carriers of
what are, in fact, Western state interests. They justify and shroud in
benevolence interventions that in reality serve the interests of political,
free market, and cultural modes of imperialism (Brown 2004: 453; Zizek
2005: 128; Mamdani 2009: 286–288).
The modern secular state’s interest in “religion” works similarly. The
state protects the putatively universal inviolability of religious freedom
Instead, I focus on a specific discursive current that has emerged in religious studies in recent years
that has argued at length for the putative impossibility and/or insidiousness of “religious freedom” as
a pristine example of how the modern, secular state deploys “human rights” as means by which to
engineer its power. The specific discursive current I take as my focus is most concentrated in a Henry
R. Luce initiative in Religion and International Affairs entitled “The Politics of Religious Freedom,”
led by primary investigators Saba Mahmood, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Winnifred Sullivan, and
Peter Danchin. See http://politics-of-religious-freedom.berkeley.edu/ This discourse has been
critically examined in Omer 2015: 27–71.
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through processes by which it simultaneously defines and administers ac-
ceptable forms and limits of “religion.” The modern secular state justifies
the scope of its power, in part, as necessary for attaining peace and sus-
taining public order in the wake of protracted periods of violent instabili-
ty, nowhere more clearly exemplified than in the European wars of
religion. This narrative portrays the secular state as necessary for perpetu-
ating stable and well-ordered political conditions in the midst of religious
pluralism. The fear is that religious pluralism could erupt in conflict in
the absence of the secular political framework that the state provides (one
that is neutral vis-à-vis religious truth claims). And yet, the argument
runs, the claim that the potential dangers of religious violence necessitate
secular state sovereignty is actually predicated upon the state’s reification
and regulation of “religion” as a key factor in state-building (that is, the
transfer of power—the “migration of the holy”—from the Church to the
state) (Cavanaugh 2009: 160–177).
The state reifies religion through processes by which it determines
what can be permitted as acceptable religion. It also determines those reli-
gious forms that must be excluded as threatening to what it determines to
be public order and stability. It identifies and delimits the elements of re-
ligion that are exempt from state interference. Though purportedly reli-
giously neutral, in fact, this activity implicates the state in political
theology. In effect, the state both defines religion and then wields its
power in permitting those forms it deems may be accommodated from
those forms of religion determined to be impermissible. This work of polit-
ical theology serves the state’s self-perpetuation by way of domestication
and assimilation. Religious forms deemed acceptable are to evince some
utility in supporting and legitimating the state’s sovereignty. Perhaps they
lend themselves as a resource for (or cohere with) the repertoire of
symbols, ritual practices, founding myths, and narratives out of which, for
instance, civil religion and religious nationalisms emerge as modes by
which the state legitimates its power. At the least, permitted forms of reli-
gion will accommodate state sovereignty by leaving it unthreatened: they
will not destabilize state-sanctioned public order and social peace.
The lenses of discourse analysis that facilitate such accounts illumi-
nate important insights about operations of power, including tacit opera-
tions of imperialism, colonialism, nationalism, and globalized market
forces. These come to light when one attends to the complex historical
emergence and genealogical formation and application of putatively self-
evident concepts such as “the human,” “freedom,” “secularity,” and “reli-
gion” (among others). At the same time, these accounts risk falling prey
to theoretical excesses that are common to unrestrained discourse analy-
ses. For instance, the inclination to power reductionism risks rendering
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such analyses incapable of treating human rights as anything other than
manifestations of state ideology. This would reduce them without re-
mainder to instruments of domination by which modern states consoli-
date and amplify their power.3
One such excessive tendency is a deterministic variation of the
genetic fallacy. This claims, in effect, that the historicized origins of a
concept determine the meaning and significance of the concept in the
present and influence how the concept will be applied in present circum-
stances. For example, certain Christian theological and missionary
origins of religious freedom portrayed it as an individual’s lack of restric-
tion in exiting or joining a religiously identified group. Genealogical de-
terminism understands these historicized origins to strongly inflect, if not
dictate, the meaning and significance that religious freedom norms can
have in their contemporary applications. In other words, the Christian
origins of the concept might be said to make any contemporary applications
ineliminably Christian. It also implicates contemporary applications of reli-
gious freedom in a conception of “freedom” that is irreformably predicated
upon an unencumbered, essentially self-determining, “choosing” self that is,
in reality, valued (and manufactured) by the modern liberal state.
Genealogical analysis of the evolution of the normative basis of reli-
gious freedom works similarly. It claims to unmask modern conceptions
of individual freedom of conscience as the product of the transvaluation
of values from a “collapsed” European Christianity into that of general-
ized “human dignity.” This genealogical evolution then determines how
these concepts can be applied, and to what effect, in the present. They
entail, for instance, state discrimination against minority religious groups
who do not conform to post-Christian, yet still tacitly Christian-ized
(because originally Christian), secular ethos that serves the interests of the
liberal state. Specifically, these norms serve to manufacture and regulate
“religious minorities” through the discourse of religious freedom in the
first place (Mahmood 2012: 418–446; Buhta 2014: 9–32). In short, genea-
logical determinism sees contemporary applications of religious freedom
3Asad bases this portion of his argument on Michel Foucault’s account of a state’s population as
that “limited group within the human family” (the “human family” as designating the jurisdiction to
which universal human rights pertain) that is, at once, “the object of the state’s care and a means of
securing its own power.” Specifically, he has in mind Foucault’s more extensive account (Foucault
1988: 145–162). It is worth noting that Foucault did not view rights exclusively through the lens of
power reductionism. In fact, he pointed to the need to pursue forms of tolerance in terms of human
rights as a means of stabilizing, and thus facilitating, processes of self-cultivation and transformation.
He makes clear that discourses of human rights and tolerance can, under certain circumstances,
provide pivotal tools for strategic possibilities of changing power relations (see Foucault 1989: 383–
390).
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(and human rights more generally) as, in effect, “poisoned at the root”
(Bhuta 2014; Moyn 2014: 63–64, 79–80).4 Such excesses leave little recourse
beyond terminal suspicion—if not outright repudiation—of human rights
principles and institutions. Indeed, few constructive counter-proposals
follow in the wake of these critiques.
With specific regard to religious freedom, the dynamic sketched above
is claimed to be inextricably inscribed in the structure (the “conceptual ar-
chitecture”) of the right to religious freedom and, therefore, in its adjudica-
tions by the ECHR (Mahmood and Danchin 2014a, 2014b: 1–8, 129–159).
In this understanding, this form of domination is not a result of misguided
interpretation and/or misapplication of the right to religious freedom.
Neither can it be attributed to context-specific considerations, such as po-
litical and/or cultural influences, interests, or purposes that bear upon these
cases (e.g. the “religious personality of certain states”). Rather, the “antimo-
ny” of religious freedom by which the state exercises its regulatory powers
over religious minorities is claimed to be intrinsic to the historical emer-
gence, philosophical grounding, and conceptual structure of the right to re-
ligious freedom itself (Hurd 2010; Mahmood and Danchin 2014a: 130).
This is not a simple refusal to assess and factor in context-specific con-
siderations, thus resulting in a blinkered view. In fact, the analyses in ques-
tion present themselves with rich jurisprudential detail and attention to
case particulars. Yet the details and particulars treated at length are, in each
case, forced through the same discursive prism. Each case study is refracted
through the putative structural deficiency of the logic and “conceptual ar-
chitecture” of the right to religious freedom and its service to the protection
of an indeterminate public order as a “technology of state governance.”
Unsurprisingly, then, the results appear to be conspicuously similar across
cases. Thus, analyses that present themselves as careful jurisprudential case
studies ultimately terminate in genealogical determinism and power reduc-
tionism in which all cases reduce to similar diagnoses (Bowen 2010; Omer
2015). The result eliminates possibilities for a self-reflexive reconceptualiza-
tion of rights norms and institutions that might be thought of, perhaps at
best, as a self-correcting enterprise, or at least as a historically extended,
dialectical tradition of discourse. This discourse might be refined and
corrected through the complex processes by which the principles are
locally contextualized, contested, and applied, and thereby further instruct-
ed through those context-specific applications.5
4The story by which Moyn re-narrates the emergence of human rights as “[dying] in the process of
being born” is challenged rather meticulously by David Little (2015).
5The approach to human rights discourse that I can only gesture toward here is consistent with the
highly historicized and contextualized account that Atalia Omer (2011) describes.
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Excesses to which genealogical analyses are tempted do not merely
risk “throwing out the baby with the bath water” by totally jettisoning
rights. More specifically for my purposes, genealogical analyses risk be-
coming tone deaf to the array of specific modes by which the power and
impact of nationalism subtly influence human rights adjudications by the
ECHR. This limits opportunities to critically illuminate, challenge, and
counter those influences. For, on the view sketched above, the influence
of nationalism (even as manifest in seemingly banal forms of civil religion)
shows up as a ligament by which the Leviathan spreads and contracts the
tentacles of its sovereignty. As a result, the nuances and ambivalences of
nationalist dimensions are rearticulated as minority versus majority
claims and identities that the state employs human rights discourse to
regulate. According to the genealogical view, the notion of “national mi-
nority” permitted the nation-state to confer membership upon its sub-
jects, but in a way that illuminated and regulated groups whose presence
was intrinsically challenging—if not threatening—to the national unity
(“shared history, culture, territory”) that the nation-state seeks to cultivate
and sustain (Mahmood 2012: 424). The result, it is said, is inexorably dis-
criminatory toward minority identities.
In the haste with which these analyses identify the terminal deficiency
intrinsic to the conceptual structure of the right to religious freedom, they
efface the internal tensions and ambivalent intricacies present in the articu-
lation of the right to religious freedom itself. And yet, these ambivalences
provide a location at which the articulation might be leveraged correctively
against misinterpretations and discriminatory applications of the principle.
Another location for contesting and correcting rights applications is found
in identifying and critically assessing the sometimes subtle means by which
application of human rights principles reflect hegemonic nationalist pur-
poses and narratives. These both present potential points at which human
rights application and adjudication might be challenged and corrected and
from which further such unjust appropriations may be fought against, as
opposed to altogether vilifying rights discourse.
WAS HUMAN RIGHTS INTERVENTION BOUND TO FAIL?:
DOGRU V. FRANCE, THE STASI COMMISSION, AND
LAWNO. 2004–228 “ON SECULARISM”
The French law “On Secularism” purports to restrain religious prac-
tice and expression to their allegedly proper location and role within a
secular nation-state. And yet, to examine such laws solely in terms of a
state’s effort to construct, sustain, and defend its sovereignty (its defense
of what it deems to be public order) obscures the specific ways that such
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uses of human rights and secularity participate in ethno-cultural—and
even religious—nationalist dynamics specific to the contexts in question.
In the case of the French headscarf ban, such laws—and more significantly,
their vindication in human rights adjudications by the ECHR—manifest
and perpetuate subtle forms of European nationalism. Closer inspection
reveals how laws prohibiting religious practice have been justified by appeal
to the authority of national-cultural identities and historical legacies. These
laws function in ways that seek to safeguard those identities. They reflect
nationalist dynamics with which those identities are interspersed. This im-
plicates such laws in forms of “religious nationalism,” despite their efforts
to make religion the object of privatization, legally excluded from public,
political life. It is by attending to the details of these dynamics and process-
es that analysts might begin to identify and correct misapplications and
misinterpretations of the right to religious freedom.
In 2003, France’s Committee of Reflection on the Application of the
Principle of Secularity in the Republic filed the result of its year-long as-
sessment to then French President Jacques Chirac. What came to be
called the Stasi Commission Report (2003) established a mandate for the
2004 law that banned the wearing of religious and symbolic dress identifi-
able as “ostentatious,” “assertive,” and “proselytizing” in public and state-
affiliated settings. The ban included large Christian crosses, Jewish yar-
mulkes, prominently worn Stars of David, and Sikh turbans, among other
conspicuous symbols. The symbol most broadly affected by the law was the
Muslim headscarf worn by school-aged young women in French public
school settings. It was also most consistently the focus of the debates and
controversy surrounding the law.
The ban was forwarded and passed into law under the auspices of ad-
hering to the constitutional secularity of the French state (est. 1905), de-
fending public order, protecting individual freedom of conscience, and
shielding Muslim public school-aged girls and young women from coer-
cive pressure (either direct or cultural) to wear religious dress (O’Brien
2005: 16–17). The Stasi Commission further cited the need for the law to
formally consolidate the processes by which wearing Muslim headscarves
would be dealt with in public schools across France. The passage of the
law set the stage for a clash between state law and the right to manifest
one’s religious identity. This found arguably its most high-profile occur-
rence in the case of a young French Muslim school girl, Belgin Dogru.
In January 1999, half-way through her first year in state secondary
school, eleven-year-old Belgin Dogru assumed the practice of wearing
hijab. On seven occasions over the course of that January, Belgin Dogru’s
physical education teacher instructed her to remove her headscarf for
class. On each occasion she refused. Insofar as the particular form of her
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head covering posed a safety hazard for class activities, she offered to
replace her headscarf with a hat or balaclava (ECHR 2008, para. 13 cf.).
However, she declined to leave her head uncovered.
By the second week of February, Belgin Dogru’s case had gone before a
school disciplinary committee. The committee expelled Dogru for failure
to participate actively in physical education classes. After this, Dogru con-
tinued her education by correspondence. Her parents filed for consider-
ation of a breach of rights at the regional and state levels, but at each level
this was declared inadmissible. In 2005, the parents submitted an applica-
tion to the ECHR, alleging that their child’s freedom of religious expression
and right to education had been violated by her expulsion from public
school.
The European Court appeared to be a particularly promising venue
for this case. The European Convention of Human Rights was put into
force by the Council of Europe in 1953 when it established the ECHR
(1954). This court (ECHR) remains the highest international venue in
which individual persons can file cases regarding the violation of their
rights by states and state actors. In international law, such actions are typ-
ically reserved for state entities alone (ECHR 1950, Articles 34–35).
The first part of Article Nine of the European Convention on Human
Rights restates verbatim Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (1948). Both declare the freedom of “thought, conscience and reli-
gion,” including freedom “either alone or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest [one’s] religion or belief, in teaching, practice,
worship and observance.” Prima facie, this article appears to challenge the
treatment of Dogru by state school and legal authorities. It also appears to
challenge the French law banning the manifestation of visible religious
symbols in public schools as a clear infringement upon the right to publicly
manifest one’s religion.6 The European Convention protects the manifesta-
tion of religious observance and practice as constituents of freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion, while the French law proscribes such
manifestation of religious identity in public schools. Surely this is a case
where human rights principles provide a clear, superordinate groundwork
for the freedom to manifest religious identity. The European Court,
however, upheld the French headscarf ban.
On what bases did the court’s application of principles of freedom of
conscience and religious expression as codified in Article Nine ultimately
justify upholding the ban on religious dress in public spaces? A pivotal
6The text of the law read: “In public primary and secondary schools, wearing signs or clothes by
which pupils clearly display a religious affiliation is forbidden.” For a detailed, observational account
of the legislative process by which the law emerged see Bowen 2008: 136.
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component in answering this question is found in Article Nine’s second
part. This part stipulates the conditions under which freedom to manifest
one’s religion or belief can be abridged by state law. Abridgement is justi-
fied as deemed necessary by the state for purposes of “maintaining public
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the pro-
tection of the rights and freedoms of others.” This addendum may exert
particularly strong limits upon freedom of conscience and manifesting
one’s religion in public, depending upon how the clause is interpreted
and applied. The ECHR interpreted it in accord with the orientation of
cultural and constitutional European secularisms more broadly. In the
Dogru case, it oriented its interpretation to accord with what the court
described as French laicite more specifically. The result was a reading of
Article 9 that purports to be fully consistent with prohibiting young
Muslim women from wearing their headscarves in public schools.
One prevailing explanation for the ECHR’s decision sees a deficiency
in the conceptual architecture of the right to religious freedom. These ar-
guments point to the structure of Article 9, citing specifically the distinc-
tion between the “forum internum” and the “forum externum,” which
correlate with parts 1 and 2 of Article 9, respectively (Mahmood and
Danchin 2014a and 2014b; Hunter 2014: 37–62).
Part 1 of Article 9 states that “everyone has the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion.” This is the “forum internum,”
because it specifies the internal location of that which is protected
(“thought, conscience and religion”). In contrast, part 2 of Article 9 ad-
dresses the “forum externum” that reserves the right of the state to
curtail the outward expression of religious freedom over concerns for
public order, safety, and the freedom of others. Viewing both parts of
Article 9 together, one can see that the conception of religion here is pu-
tatively intrinsically internal. It is confined to a “religious core” of belief
understood as personal faith and/or the deliverances of individual con-
science. The state’s power of explicit regulation, by contrast, is external.
It pertains to any and all outward expressions of belief and conscience.
In its proper location (the forum internum), religious belief is licensed
to operate without interference from the state by virtue of a self-limiting
renunciation of state power by the state. At the same time, the
state asserts its capacity to regulate the outward manifestation of
religious belief.
Upon closer inspection of Article 9, however, this account of its con-
ceptual architecture depends upon on a subtle textual sleight of hand. To
characterize the domain of part I as strictly that of “thought, conscience
and religion” recognizes the first clause of part 1 of Article 9, but elides
the important exposition of the first clause that is introduced by the
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remainder of part 1.7 The remainder of part 1 explicates the preceding clause
in terms of the many forms in which “freedom of thought, conscience and
religion” may be manifest and, indeed, embodied. The “freedom of thought,
conscience and religion” delineated in part 1 of Article 9 explicitly “includes
freedom to change [one’s] religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest [one’s] religion
or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” In other words, the
full articulation of the right to religious freedom includes private “thought,
conscience and religion,” but also “teaching, practice, worship, observance”
alone or in community with others, in public or in private.
It is false then (or at least it is a partial account) to claim that the
structure of the right to religious freedom in Article 9 spirits religion
away into a sanctum of the inner self by defining it as pure belief and/or
the unadulterated urgings of conscience. Still, we find ourselves confront-
ed by the question: What difference does the exact text of part 1 make in
the actual Article 9 jurisprudential ruling of the ECHR? Clearly, the
ECHR has consistently ruled as if the conceptual architecture of Article 9
dictated that religious freedom be unregulated by the state only “internal-
ly,” and that outward manifestation is fair game for regulation and exclu-
sion. But this does not endorse the one-sidedness of the claim that Article
9 is intrinsically flawed in its conceptual architecture. When we attend to
Article 9 in its entirety, we find that the principle of religious freedom it
claims admits of internal complexity and even a degree of ambivalence.
And this, at least potentially, provides leverage by which to contest and
expand the account of the conceptual architecture from Danchin and
Mahmood’s reductive account, which then dictates the terms through
which they read each case.
One might counter that the terms in which the meaning of “freedom
of thought, conscience and religion” are explicated in the latter phrases of
Article 9, part 1, reflect a conception of the individual as a self-possessing
and self-determining agent. Such an agent chooses whether or not he or
she will “be religious,” in what senses, and with what group (if not in iso-
lation). An individual, so conceived, decides if, when, and how he or she
prefers to cast off that identity and exit the group. However, this reading
is by no means the only possible one. Nor is it a reading that is necessary.
An alternative reading makes it possible to conceive of the social
7This account is set forth most forcefully by Mahmood and Danchin, who identify part 1
exclusively with the phrase “freedom of thought, conscience and religion,” and part 2 exclusively with
reference to manifestation. This dichotomous characterization recurs repeatedly throughout their
contributions to the volume, and each time without reference to the multiple qualifying features of
part 1 (see 2014a and 2014b: 3, 129, 145, 146, 148).
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constitution of personhood and of freedom made possible through rela-
tionally normative constraints. This conception contrasts with individual
agency conceived as the absence of constraints upon self-determination,
and with belief conceived as a cognitively intentional assent/choice.
Social constitution of personhood is entirely compatible with—indeed,
can and has been integrated into—accounts that retain conceptions of in-
dividual agency and intentional action, and even revised and repositioned
accounts of autonomy.8 On such accounts, insofar as internal “belief” (as
cognitive assent or affective inclination) remains a germane descriptor, it
is interwoven with, and dependent upon, more basic enculturation into
cultural and linguistic social practices and institutions.
A comparable interpretive flexibility applies to arguments against the
viability of religious freedom based upon the capacity of state power to
determine what counts as public order. In defining public order, the argu-
ment runs, states determine what exceptions can be made to religious
freedom in the name of protecting public order. Yet the reasons that a
state might make exceptions to religious freedom in the name of defend-
ing public order are underdetermined. They require interpretation and
application within concrete considerations and constraints. They are not
(pace Mahmood and Danchin) essentially indeterminate (Mahmood and
Danchin 2014b, 147–1148ff.; Agrama 2010, 504–515). In other words,
the right to religious freedom so constituted may be misadjudicated in
discriminatory ways—recent Article 9 jurisprudence is predominantly, if
not intentionally, exclusionary toward Muslim conceptions of religious
practice. And yet, such adjudications can be assessed as just that: misadju-
dications. The adjudications are not locked into ironclad predetermina-
tion by the conceptual architecture of the right to religious freedom. At
the same time, these adjudications cannot be justified in virtue of whatev-
er a state determines public order to be. Rather, the adjudications depend
on the exchange of reasons and contextual specifics (including the articu-
lation of power) that may be made explicit and subject to analysis and
criticism, and challenged on a context-specific basis.
For instance, ECHR Article 9 jurisprudence may be (and largely
is, some have argued) predicated upon an inadequate conception of
8See, for example, Nedelsky 2012 and Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000. For another account of
embodied agential individuality that takes its starting point from Asad’s account of individuality as
“self-governing, but not autonomous,” but then moves importantly beyond it in the examples she
offers, see Scott (2007: 141–148). The kind of agency Scott describes is not dichotomously opposed to
the language of individual rights and responsibilities. I have developed and defended accounts
that integrate socially constituted personhood and individual freedom in greater detail in both
philosophical and theological quarters (Springs 2009, 2012).
Journal of the American Academy of ReligionPage 14 of 34
 by guest on M
ay 30, 2016
http://jaar.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
“religious practice” on the part of the court.9 And this, among other things,
contributes to an identifiably discriminatory trajectory vis-à-vis practice-
oriented conceptions of religious identity. But again, if we recognize this as
an interpretive deficiency, it is conceivable that this jurisprudential trajecto-
ry could be subject to change. Its causes and conditions could be histori-
cized and made explicit, interrogated, challenged, and, over time, altered.
As such, Article 9 is not intrinsically deficient or “poisoned at the root.”
If the textual constitution of Article 9 evades the charge of structural deter-
minism, does this mean that the series of bad applications of the principle
by the ECHR came about purely “by accident” (Moyn 2014, 63)? Not at all.
In fact, examining the triangulated textual relations between the arguments
constructed to support the French Law on Secularism in the Stasi
Commission Report of 2003, the process of drafting the law banning hijab
in 2004, and the text of the ECHR ruling illuminate specific influences and
concrete dynamics of the decision process. For instance, these documents
develop their case in terms of uniquely French (but also more broadly
European) conceptions of secularism. They identify this in the form of
principles that are construed as fundamental, and arguably nonnegotiable,
features of the nation’s identity. As such, they reflect a certain form of na-
tionalism. This means that these developments are political as much as
they are socio-culturally embedded and inflected. Moreover, they cannot be
fully understood, nor adequately evaluated, without attending to the na-
tionalist influences that affect the context of application, justifications, and
aims of, for example, the ECHR itself. But this requires illuminating the
ways that ethno-religious and ethno-cultural nationalism inform how the
ECHR adjudicates human rights cases. Illuminating these operations is a
crucial step in thinking correctively and constructively about the processes
and practices of human rights applications and adjudications in various
contexts and circumstances.
“A FEWMETERS OF CHIFFON”: THICKLY DESCRIBING THE
INFLUENCES OF NATIONALISM IN DOGRU V. FRANCE
The Articles on freedom of religious expression in the ECHR present
themselves as regulatory principles that stand as potential correctives to
9See, for example, a particularly powerful article by Lourdes Peroni (2014). I consider Peroni’s
work an example of critically yet correctively engaging contemporary human rights discourse in the
spirit of the approach I propose in this article, rather than a simple deconstructionist repudiation of
rights discourse. For comparable arguments about the risks of overly narrow and outdated legal
definitions of “religion” and “belief”—and the need for the ECHR to be open to new developments
regarding these terms—see Gunn 2003: 195 and Vickers 2006: 27.
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European states’ laws. As such, one might expect the European Court to
rule against the French state and vindicate Belgin Dogru’s right to free-
dom of religious expression. How, then, to reconcile the ECHR’s vindica-
tion of the ban?
If we examine the context, historical background, and national
culture, several factors surface that are particularly relevant to this ques-
tion. First, French legislators worded and passed the law on secularism
with the explicit intent of side-stepping potential challenge by the ECHR.
They did so, moreover, under direct instruction from a vice-president of
the European Court at the time, Jean-Paul Costa, who was also a member
of France’s state council (Bowen 2008: 137–140). If we thickly describe
these circumstances, we find that the conception of public order in which
the French law was embedded was anything but indeterminate. In fact,
there was considerable political wrangling with Costa over the exact
wording, force, and scope of the law to maximize its chances of passing
ECHR scrutiny.
Costa strongly advised that the law would need to delineate institutional
settings and set limits. He argued that the wording of the law must exclu-
sively target signs that “conspicuously display” and/or “draw attention to”
the religious identity of the student. He advised against any attempt to ban
all “visible” symbols, as numerous legislators in the French National
Assembly had initially proposed (Bowen 2008: 137–140). The law would
have to permit so-called “discreet” signs. Wording any more ambitious or
less precise, Costa insisted, would almost certainly be viewed by the ECHR
as disproportionate restriction, even if it were justified as a threat to public
order. The ECHR would assuredly strike it down, despite the fact that nu-
merous French legislators argued that the laic identity of French public life
and the state should mean that any visible signs of particular religious iden-
tity disrupted public order with “communitarian signaling.”
Second, the conceptions of “gender equality” and “freedom,” under-
stood to be central to French national identity, were similarly shared by
the ECHR and visible in court precedents. Because these values were so
carefully calibrated, the ECHR could follow the Stasi Commission Report
in ascribing the symbol’s principal significance—and one of its primary
dangers—as a practice that is “imposed upon women by a religious
precept [which is hard to square with the principle of gender equality]”
(ECHR 2008, para. 64; cf. O’Brien 2005: 54). This positions veiling as a
practice that intrinsically subjugates women.
Clearly, hijab is a practice that distinguishes women from men. It can
be perceived as treatment of women that is self-evidently unequal when
equality is conceived to be identical treatment and/or obligations re-
gardless of one’s gender, ethnicity, and so forth. From this perspective,
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religious commitments that distinguish duties and/or status based upon
differences of gender (in Islam, women’s veils, men’s beards) reflect a
form of religion that is intrinsically unequal. The Stasi Commission for-
warded this view. Indeed, it claimed that in so far as hijab is a compulsory
act of obedience, it is ostensibly coercive or pressured (especially with
regard to school-aged girls). Moreover, the commission considered the
visibility and assertiveness of these identities particularly harmful in
public schools. France’s public schools are widely (and historically) per-
ceived as places in which pupils are cultivated into French citizenship;
where “new French citizens are made” (Scott 2007: 107). The Stasi
Commission portrays a conception of subordination-by-hijab to which
counter-examples are not permitted. However Muslim women described
their having received, embodied, and embraced the practice of wearing
hijab,10 proponents of the law argued that those women had, in effect, in-
ternalized their own oppression, implicating women in “self-discrimina-
tion” (O’Brien 2005: 42). They stigmatize self-reflective and purposeful—
even self-described deliberate—participation on the basis of first having
determined uncoerced participation to be, in effect, impossible.
The ECHR further followed the Stasi Commission in portraying the
French law as a necessary case of limiting the freedom to publicly mani-
fest one’s religious identity as a collateral consequence of protecting
public order and safety. For instance, the court cited as precedent a 1978
case in Britain (also ruled upon by the court) in which the state com-
pelled a motorcyclist, a practicing Sikh, to remove his turban in order to
wear protective headgear. Likewise, the court cited precedents to justify
the compulsory removal of religious garb for the purposes of security
checks at airports or consulate entryways (ECHR 2008, para. 64, citing X
v. the United Kingdom, no. 7992/77, commission decision of 12 July
1978). In such cases, the court considered limiting the individual’s
freedom to manifest his religious identity to be an indirect effect of en-
forcing a safety measure deemed necessary by the state. The court treated
these precedents of public health and public order as parallel cases to, for
instance, a public school teacher who might manifest her religious identi-
ty by wearing an Islamic headscarf while teaching and thereby (putative-
ly) unduly influence her students. The court further found these
precedents comparable to a public school student who wears a headscarf
while attending and participating in class. Clearly in the latter cases it is
10“[M]y headscarf is part of me. I won’t take it off. We have to educate the state about why the
scarf is so important and why there should be no fear of it,” Karima Debza, an Algerian-born French
Muslim woman, stated while casting her vote in support of the creation of an official organization to
represent French Muslims (Sciolino 2003).
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not the interest of public safety that compels delimitation of individual
freedom. It is, rather, concern about the impact of the symbol upon the
freedom and formation of others. Such a “powerful external symbol,” said
the court, might well exert a “proselytizing effect” (ECHR 2008, para. 64).
Finally, the ECHR followed the Stasi Commission in treating the case
in terms of compliance with the rules: consistent and uniform articula-
tion and application of French law. The prevailing view of secularism pro-
vided the parameters for determining rule violations. It is here that the
ECHR ruling demonstrates its most forthright deference to French laicite.
It construed laicite not only in terms of a constitutional principle but
(however inadvertently) as a cultural ethos. The pivotal passage from the
court’s ruling on this point reads:
In France, as in Turkey and Switzerland, secularism is a constitutional
principle, and a founding principle of the Republic to which the entire
population adheres, and the protection of which appears to be of prime
importance, in particular in schools. The Court reiterates that an attitude
which fails to respect that principle will not necessarily be accepted as
being covered by the freedom to manifest one’s religion and will not
enjoy the protection of Article 9 of the Convention (see: Refah Partisi
and others v. Turkey) (ECHR 2008, para. 72).
Note how the language of the ECHR here moves from invoking laicite
as a constitutional principle to the claim “that the entire population
adheres to it.” These two claims then contribute, in tandem, to the “prime
importance” ascribed to defending that principle—and this, especially in
public schools. Note also that this defense goes so far as to protect against
an “attitude which fails to respect that principle.”11
With the above passage we find what is actually a threefold warrant in
play. The first appeals to the sovereignty of the state with reference to the
status of laicite as a constitutional principle. The second appeals to the
history and character of the state’s identity. This claim is, in effect, that
the constitutional principle of laicite–with its attendant ideals of gender
equality and freedom as self-determination—has been fundamental to
11It is important to note that the ECHR recognized that the 2004 law was passed several years after
the events that led to Belgin Dogru’s expulsion from school. Technically, the ECHR distinguishes its
legal basis as the 1989 ruling of the Conseil d’Etat. And yet, it reflects far more directly the spirit of
the 2004 law, and its justification by the Stasi Commission, than the 1989 ruling. In fact, the 1989
ruling by the French Supreme Court stated that “the Muslim headscarf is not in itself an ostentatious
symbol that could be banned from schools; it could only be forbidden if it were used as an instrument
of pressure on girls who were reluctant to wear it.” This left considerable leeway for case-specific
interpretation and flexibility in enforcement. A primary purpose of the 2004 law was to alleviate the
need for case-by-case assessment by putting a formal law in place.
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the Republic since its inception. Third, the court appeals to a form of au-
thority it finds reflected in popular consent (“that the entire population
adheres to it”). Taken all together, the interests of not only the state, but
also central features of the nation (“peoplehood” embodied in shared na-
tional culture, history, and identity of the Republic), exert a fundamental
influence in the ECHR ruling. Arguably, this is the interpretive influence
of “the religious personality of the state” upon the ECHR adjudication.
Note the important points of contrast between how Mahmood and
Danchin describe the indeterminacy of the public order that is dictated
by the state and the underdeterimacy that is visible when paying close at-
tention to the actual justifications for the ban. If the concept of public
order is intrinsically indeterminate, then the state’s role in determining
its significance and scope should be absolute: it is described as “indissolu-
bly linked to the sovereign power of the modern state” (Agrama 2010: 500).
The state determines the content and character of the concept “public
order” as a framework within which it then determines what counts as per-
missibly religious as opposed to disruptively and/or threateningly religious.
Through such determinations—and through enforcing them—it vindicates
its sovereignty and reinforces its authority. This is a process central to the
so-called “technology of state governance.”
Such a position begins with the pivotal insight that public space, and
its putative stability and order, is unavoidably articulated by power.
However, it turns that insight into a reductionist contention, according to
which power manifest in terms of state interests defines and enforces the
nature and limits of public order. On that basis, further, the state defines and
domesticates acceptable forms of religion. This is the state as Leviathan,
and the putative “freedom of religion” is one of its tentacles.
What difference does it make to think of the concept of public order
as underdetermined? Recognizing the flexibility of any conception of
public order is likewise attuned to the claim that what can count as public
order at a given point is context specific and that the role of power in ar-
ticulating that concept remains unavoidable, but not reductionistically so.
Rather, power plays out in the interpretive justifications and arguments
(and what is recognized as justification and argument) by which such
claims are conceptualized, articulated, justified, ultimately adjudicated,
and then enforced. Power manifests, further, in the institutional struc-
tures and arrangements that such conceptualizations enter into. But this
fact makes it all the more pressing to explicate those dynamics of power
in order to scrutinize the particular details of the arguments and claims
and the contextual histories and sociological formations in place.
In the present case, to explicate and critically assess the processes by
which the operative concept of “public order” was formed and deployed
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to uphold the headscarf ban in France, we must attend to the construc-
tion of the Stasi report and the nature and basis of the arguments it for-
warded. We must examine the constraints and limitations that the
commission and French legislators avoided reaching beyond and why. In
other words, if the conception of “public order” is interpretively underde-
termined, then the claims, arguments, and histories of the concept in this
context matter. They are still recognized as embedded within and inflect-
ed by socio-cultural, historical, and legal background. The claims and ar-
guments are the very substance of political contest. However, ostensibly,
the outcomes of the arguments (their success or failure) could be differ-
ent. If, by contrast, public order is ultimately indeterminate, then the ar-
guments and justifications are always conceptual and legal camouflage
for the arbitrariness of the state’s sovereign power.
The French state representatives had to make the case with great pre-
cision that their accounts of public order and concern for the freedom of
others fell within the limits of what the ECHR could recognize as within
the so-called “margin of appreciation.” This included the possibility that
their arguments concerning the protection of public order might be re-
jected. Indeed, the ECHR was already inclined to be suspicious of over-
reach by the French state due to its previous aggressiveness regarding
Article 9 cases. In short, the conception of public order was anything but
indeterminate. It was, rather, contested, negotiated, and strategized about
in terms quite specific and concrete. It was the subject of interpretive pos-
sibilities and considerable political wrangling that were enabled, but also
constrained, by a range of historical, social, and political considerations.
To sharpen this interpretive and contestatory dimension, compare
the more recent ECHR ruling in Ahmet Arslan and Others v. Turkey (no.
41135/98). In this case, members of a religious group identifying them-
selves as the Aczimendi tarikatÿ (founded in 1986) refused to remove
their turbans while on trial at Turkish State Security Court under
Turkey’s antiterrorism laws, as is required by law in Turkish courts.12
They were charged, convicted, and fined for violating Turkey’s law (2596)
that prohibits wearing forms of religious dress in public spaces unless
specified for religious ceremonies. All their appeals failed (Id. at §§ 10–
12“The applicants, 127 Turkish nationals, belong to a religious group they referred to as Aczimendi
tarikatÿ, founded in 1986. (Id. at § 6.) On October 20, 1996, the applicants, coming from various
parts of Turkey, met in Ankara to participate in a religious ceremony organized at the Kocatepe
Mosque. They were wearing the distinctive clothing of their group, a turban, salvar (traditional baggy
trousers), and a tunic, all of them black, and each man carried a stick. They toured the town, and
following various incidents, were arrested on October 20, 1996, and placed in preventive detention.
(Id. at § 7.)” The charges under which they were first detained were dismissed several years later. (Id.
at §§ 8 & 18.) (Atwill 2014).
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17). The group brought their case before the ECHR, which ruled that the
Turkish government violated Article 9. The ECHR did not question the
legality of the Turkish law that restricts wearing religious garb and head-
gear in public spaces. The ECHR ruled, however, that Turkey’s appeal to
its law as vindication for its treatment of this religious group was defi-
cient. The burden was on the Turkish government to make a compelling
case that the group’s religious apparel presented a threat to public safety,
public order, and/or protection of the freedoms and rights of others.
The primary point of this case for my purposes is that arguably the
ECHR found Turkey in violation of Article 9, because its case lacked ade-
quate justification for its claims about alleged threats to public order and
the freedom and rights of others. Turkey relied on the integrity and sover-
eignty of its laws (Law 2596 and Law 671). It did this, moreover, with ref-
erence to the centrality of the principle of secularism in Turkey’s
democratic system. The ECHR found these insufficient grounds on which
to prohibit the public manifestation of religious identity in this case. Of
course, it is conceivable that a more shrewd and calculated argument
would have passed the scrutiny of the ECHR, much as France’s did. And
yet, the central point illuminated in this example is that the state cannot
make whatever claims it wants to regarding the nature, basis, and signifi-
cance of public religious practice, public order, and the freedoms of
others. An array of constraints interposes a degree of answerability, and
thus, the risk that state arguments and efforts might fail. Interpretive flex-
ibility, and thus contestability, of concepts such as “public order” and
“the freedom of others” by no means amounts to indeterminacy.
RELIGIOUS PERSONALITY OF THE STATE:
CIVIC VERSUS RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM
The results of my analysis ought not be read as questioning the indis-
pensability of human rights understood as a discourse that might provide
normative thrust against the discriminatory tendencies of nationalism.
Human rights provide a powerful set of normative terms. They aid in illu-
minating conflict, discrimination, and repression across international
contexts. But given the dispersed and subtle nationalism that supported the
French law “On Secularism,” can human rights language serve as terms of
moral (and international legal) criticism and resistance that would oppose
and counter the religious nationalist restrictions under which French
Muslim students are forced to work? I suggest that it can. What does this
require? It might look like a form of immanent criticism in which voices on
all sides call for recognition of the religious character of French nationalism
as one reason for its discrimination against its Muslim population.
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The fact that attending to the operations of state power implicates
concerns about the nation comes as no surprise. In most of its modern
(i.e. post-Westphalian) conceptualizations, the state is the legal and insti-
tutional means by which a people consolidates and administers political
self-determination. This conception renders the terms not only inter-
linked (e.g. “nation-state”), but effectively coterminous, simply as a “qual-
itatively novel” development of the modern era (Smith 2003: 46–49;
Anderson 1991; Gellner 1997). And yet, what is conceptualized as a de facto
coterminous relation of state and nation results from an unreflective—
indeed, unnecessary and perhaps detrimental— conflation of the two (Jakelic
2010; Omer 2015). It is precisely such a conflation that subtly unfolds in
the passage from that ECHR ruling above. As a result, concerns to pre-
serve and protect a national identity as a basis for the ECHR ruling are as
understated in the ruling itself (and underattended to in the legal litera-
ture) as they are influential upon its outcome. Recognition of this wrinkle
in the ECHR vindicating the ban opens onto a wide vista of critical con-
cerns that remain occluded so long as state and individual are the primary
terms of analysis.
The case of Dogru v. France helps highlight a seminal, and yet fre-
quently overlooked, wrinkle in human rights discourse. Rights principles
will inevitably be applied in the midst of specific contexts. These contexts
will be shot through with political interests and cultural presuppositions
and freighted by historical baggage, all of which bear upon the construal
and application of human rights principles. The articles and protocols of
the European Convention of Human Rights—just as those of the Universal
Declaration—do not interpret and apply themselves. If rights norms and
institutions are indispensable, they must not be perceived as an arrival at a
final destination, but rather as a point of departure into a persistently
unfolding tradition of discourse. The internal currents of this discourse
proliferate and become more complex even as they at times double back
on themselves, in ways that might admit of fallibilism, and the effort to be
self-correcting.
Human rights discourse faces the challenge of overcoming repressive
structures and customs, precisely because the latter may frame, fill-out, and
inflect the ethos that informs the application of human rights principles.
The implication, then, is that human rights discourse must be accompanied
by sustained attention to, and reflection upon, the background, interests,
and purposes of the contexts and circumstances of application. This re-
quires making explicit and contending with the (often tacit) exertion of
biases, prejudices, and repressive histories of the circumstances in question.
It requires intentional search and sometimes distressing illumination. It is
almost certain to meet with resistance.
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In the French case, this requires critical reflection upon orienting con-
ceptions of gender equality, religious tolerance, and freedom that have
difficulty recognizing, much less making sense of, accounts different from
their own. Indeed, these conceptions turn out to be noticeably intolerant
of what they do not recognize as of their own kind. The irony to be illu-
minated and grappled with through critique is that the French cultural
orientation and ethos is very much of the same kind as the Islamic aggres-
siveness and intolerance that the Stasi Commission Report proclaims to
be endangering and vies for legislation against.
Joan Scott has illuminated the racialized dimensions of this discourse
(2007: chap. 2).13 If, however, we introduce the lens of ethnicity as an angle
by which to approach the ethnocentric dimensions in this case, then we
can draw upon what Max Weber argued were the “elective affinities”
evinced between ethnic, religious, and national identities and modes of as-
sociation (Weber 1968: 378–398).14 Doing this helps us to recognize that
the ethnocentric sensibilities of French laws, institutions, and people
toward Muslim residents is not a preconception and prejudice that can be
corrected simply by recognizing the equal rights of fellow citizens. Rather,
such ethnocentricity may be interwoven with, and to some degree constitu-
tive of, national identities and histories. These are received, articulated,
embodied, lived out, perpetuated, and legitimized in forms of mythical na-
tional stories and self-conceptions, symbolic and ritual practices, and the
seemingly banal and perhaps inconspicuous forms of everyday civil reli-
gion. In the French case, this civil religious nationalism presents itself in
conceptions of gender equality, republican commitments to pluralism and
mutual toleration, and freedom of conscience that are vindicated in terms
of protection of human rights. Yet these terms are invoked and deployed in
ways that render them means by which inequalities, marginalization, and
humiliation are produced. This presses the analysis to a deeper level—
namely, to the ways that forms of power dynamics and differentials mark
out and inflect the public life within which manifestations and expressions
of identity will be adjudicated as acceptable or unacceptable.
13Scott makes the case that ethno-cultural dimensions have morphed into pervasive forms of
racism toward Muslims in France. Differences of culture, religion, and ethnicity become reified and
are then taken to be “innate, indelible, unchangeable” (2007: 45).
14Elective affinities are not the assimilation or reduction of one concept to the other but the
highlighting of resemblances, thus avoiding the claim, for example, that nationalism is a religion.
Weber identified ethnicity as “subjective belief in a common descent” (Weber 1968: 389). From this
perspective, “ethnonationalism” names forms of nationalism in which “ethnicity or ethnic features of
identity are used to forge national ties or determine membership in the group. Such ethnic features
may include a shared language, belief in a common ancestry, as well as inherited cultural practices,
customs, manners, attitudes, and sensibilities shared by (and constitutive of) a particular group”
(Omer and Springs 2013: 14–15).
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On a thickly descriptive account, we find these power dynamics exert-
ing themselves through protection and enforcement of norms into which
French citizens must putatively be enculturated. For instance, Muslim
residents and Muslim citizens of France demonstrate that they are “the
good kind of Muslim” for France by demonstrating that they are “bad” or
“indifferent” practitioners of Islam. They do this by not practicing, or
practicing sporadically and without apparent dedication or passion. They
thereby demonstrate that their Muslim identity is sufficiently (or wholly)
subordinate to their commitments to, and identification with, superordi-
nate identities of state, nation, and national culture.
To construe this as the aggressive segregation of religious practice and
identity markers into nonpublic spaces of personal life and, thereby, as
state encroachment upon individual freedom of religious expression is to
miss the substance of the situation. Addressing this in terms of ethno-reli-
gious nationalism instead illuminates features of hegemonic processes of
enculturation that some refer to as the “laicization of behavior” (Bowen
2008: 82–85). This “laicization” operates bidirectionally. On the one
hand, French Muslim citizens and residents strive to prove that they can
become, and in fact are, authentically “French.” Conversely, the “laiciza-
tion of behavior” is used by state actors and representatives as metrics to
determine which Muslims are insufficiently assimilated and therefore
which are candidates for profiling and suspicion of fanatical or potential-
ly terrorist behavior. These metrics are also used by immigration officers
to determine whether those applying for citizenship have demonstrated
“sufficient assimilation” (Bennhold 2008).
In short, when situated within the context of French religious nation-
alism, laicite is not simply a policy, or principle, or general orientation
toward religion. It is a set of commitments and dispositions, articulated
through national narratives and histories, and cultivated in ritualized
practices and institutional spaces that are especially “set apart” for the ac-
culturation of citizens into these norms and dispositions. To examine
these dynamics as features of religious nationalism illuminates how the
dynamics of exclusion and humiliation cast in the form of law—and vin-
dicated through the application of human rights norms and institutions—
are actually more culturally and socially diffuse than a simple majority
versus minority configuration permits. For it is through these historical
and cultural modes that state power becomes legitimated power, that is,
becomes right authority. This authority presents itself as normalized,
persuasively formative, culturally “taken for granted,” and thus enforce-
able through various forms of social pressure. In the present case, it is
enforceable by law and even by human rights judgments (down to the
very “attitude which fails to respect the principle” of laicite). Indeed, the
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recognition of—and assent to—formation in accord with this authority
presents itself as constitutive of citizenship itself. Once this diagnosis has
been rendered, what are the means of responding? Is there a role for
“rights” in this context?
SYMBOLIC GUERILLAWARFARE OR ETHICAL PRACTICE?
Arguably, the ban on headscarves in French schools generates the
very phenomenon that it aims to prohibit (Roy 2007: 98–102). It has the
effect of reifying the meaning of the symbolic practice. This rigidity facili-
tates a potential counter-thrust for the practice—facilitating novel, even
innovative applications of the symbol. Both religious and national identi-
ties may change in multiple directions. Innovation may occur as fortified
and enriched forms of piety and obedience. Through such processes, nor-
mative structures and justifications of the practice can be brought to ex-
plicit attention and assessed. In this framing, the practice might be
debated and (ostensibly) adjusted, even as a part of pursuing a revival of
and/or preserving cultural heritage and identity. To call these dynamics
“conservative” is already to have misnamed them. They may be more ade-
quately termed “traditionalist,” but via a conception of tradition that is
not intrinsically reactionary and retrograde.15
At the same time, there are more forthright and perhaps radical forms
of innovation in which the hijab is used in novel ways. Here one thinks of
Frantz Fanon’s description of the tactical uses of the veil in French Algeria.
It was precisely because the French viewed the eradication of the veil as one
of the ways they could accomplish their civilizing mission in Algeria that
Fanon could claim so effectively that the veil must be worn as an act of sol-
idarity and resistance. In Fanon’s estimation, the veil was an implement of
religious and cultural tradition that would instrumentalize itself out of exis-
tence. To dissolve the colonialist subjugation of the Algerians by the French
would permit them to move into forms of equality that were neither dictat-
ed by the colonialist occupiers, nor were a cheap imitation of French égalité
(seemingly freely chosen, but in fact driven by the internalized self-subjuga-
tion of the colonized subject) (Fanon 1965: 61–63).
However, if taken as an exhaustive account of what critique and resis-
tance look like, this is too thin and one-dimensional to capture the
15For accounts of this drawn from interviews with French Muslim women, many of whom adopted
the practice of hijab at an older age, see Joan Scott’s treatment of Dounia Bouzar and Saida Kada
(2003). For further elaboration of the relation of novelty (and thus, freedom) through constraints of
ethical practice and how this opens avenues of innovation within the broader constraints of a
tradition, see Springs 2009.
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complicated realities in contexts of contemporary France. It is true that
many young French Muslim women have adopted the practice of
wearing hijab as acts of resistance or markers of defiance. In some cases,
it represents a refusal to consent (however tacitly) to subject themselves
to the promise of full-fledged assimilation into, and thereby the promise
of acceptance by, French society. And yet, this subversive instrumental
use of the veil for defiance and resistance is the converse of the French
conceptualization of it as exclusively a means of subjugation. As the Stasi
Commission reported, even in its inescapable subjugation of women, per-
sistent veil wearing became a form of “symbolic guerilla warfare” against
French culture and the French state. In short, this instrumentalization for
subversive and resistant purposes fails to capture the multiple and con-
flicting motivations for the practice that are ambivalent and messy.16
Comparably, the currents of change and innovation also are not uni-
directional. This has implications for conceptualizing French nationalism
and the public manifestation of religious identities in France. The multi-
plicity permits moving beyond the dead-locked conception of “religious
freedom” and “human rights” as the instruments by which the nation-
state manufactures “religion,” in both its acceptable (i.e. state-sanctioned
and reinforcing varieties) and unacceptable forms (e.g. forms and features
of “political Islam”). Both forms of agency may effect innovation that
ventilates and alters the more confining and subjugating forms of the tra-
dition. Indeed, they may have an altering and even transforming effect. In
fact, innovation embedded in instances of the practice may produce more
lasting changes than a formal effort to challenge and reform it.
Attunement to the array of significances and roles that hijab may
convey makes it possible to ask how that practice might innovatively
inform and inflect French national identity. This framing recognizes na-
tional identities as contestable and multi-variant. What might it mean for
hijab in France to be, at once, a distinctive practice (recognized as reflect-
ing multiple religious and cultural inflections of significance and purpos-
es) that also refuses to simply “be accommodated” (i.e. domesticated)
insofar as its forms are deemed acceptable by the French state? How
might it look for such a conception of the practice to, at the same time,
find a role as a public practice that coheres with an expanding French
16For first-person accounts of this, see Islamic Human Rights Commission 2009. Seyla Benahbib
also identifies possibilities of religious innovation in veil-wearing in the French context. She construes
this as a “private act of faith and conscience rather than as a communal act of faith and belonging”
(and as such, the “Protestantization” of the practice) (2006: 58). My claim, by contrast, is that
innovation occurs through participation in social practices understood to be most basically public
and relational (though they do not preclude conceptualization of individual agency and intention).
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republic and culture? In fact, there are powerful examples of events very
much like this having happened. However, they are not recognized as po-
tential examples of “French Islam.”
The laws against public manifestation of religious identity in the form
of headscarves, in effect, create what they aim to combat. They do this, on
one hand, by reifying the alleged meaning and significance of the symbol.
At the same time, in so doing, they alienate—and ostensibly humiliate—
many Muslim people. This is an effect of exclusion (as opposed to out-
right assimilation, or domestication through conditional accommodation
by the state). Arguably, one way to consolidate and spawn solidarity
among a population (in this case, a largely immigrant, economically dis-
advantaged, and vulnerable population to begin with) is to identify and
deal with that population as an “out group” in custom and law. And
indeed, as this occurred in response to the French headscarf ban, cohe-
sion resulted among those groups. This was then taken to further verify
their opposition to integration and their communalist intentions. On this
basis, it is further identified as an especially hazardous breeding ground
for the Stasi Commission’s most emphatic concern: political Islam.
Opposition to the law indeed generated solidarity among Muslims,
and Muslim women in particular. In fact, Muslim women and Muslim
groups organized an array of protests and demonstrations in the weeks
leading up to the enactment of the law “on secularism.” These protests,
however, never took place; or rather, they did not take place as public
actions simply opposing the law banning headscarves. In the days leading
up to the law taking effect in late August 2004, a group identified as the
“Islamic Army in Iraq” took two French journalists in Iraq hostage. They
demanded that France reverse its headscarf ban in exchange for the jour-
nalists’ release. French Muslim communities quite outspokenly, and uni-
formly, rejected these efforts. In fact, they transformed what had been
scheduled as protest rallies against the law banning the wearing of hijab
into solidarity with France rallies throughout the country. Muslim
women in their headscarves publicly declared: “We will not allow our
headscarves to be soiled with blood” (Leick 2004).17
17“The Muslim faithful and clerics came together to pray at the Great Mosque of Paris, built in
1924 in honor of Muslim colonial troops who had perished for France in World War II. The service
was also attended by Interior Minister Dominique de Villepin and Paris’ socialist mayor, Bertrand
Delanoe. The rector of the mosque, Dalil Boubakeur, also chairman of the French Council of the
Muslim Faith, solemnly declared the ‘solidarity of Muslims with the entire French nation, to which
we fully and completely belong.’ . . . Solidarity rallies with active Muslim participation were held
throughout the country, in Marseilles, Montpelier, Lille, La Rochelle, Besançon and Lyon. Veiled
Muslim women proclaimed: ‘We will not allow our headscarves to be soiled with blood’ ” (Leick
2004).
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It is important to examine the nuance of what transpired in these cir-
cumstances. This was not a plea for the French state to simply accommo-
date Muslim headscarf practices. Nor was this assimilationist behavior on
the part of the protesting Muslim women. In fact, the women persisted in
their stated opposition to the law. They persisted in their opposition to
the portrayal of the veil as a symbol of communalist opposition interlaced
with the subordination of women. And yet, in precisely this “counter-
accommodationist” capacity, hijab became a cause and occasion for solid-
arity with French national culture and the state. Hijab became a mode of
resistance to precisely the forms of violent extremism and terrorism that
the Stasi Commission Report, the French law “On Secularism,” and, in
effect, the ECHR ruling in Dogru v. France, project upon scarf-wearing
itself. In these circumstances, the wearing of hijab was, at once, defiance
and solidarity in tandem with the protesters’ insistence of their full be-
longing to French national culture.
This example further illuminates the pliability of the symbolic practice.
It gestures toward the capacity of its orienting norms to be deployed in ways
that defy an either/or positioning in the national context in question—
either accommodating/assimilating to declared (if not mandated) norms
of the nation-state, or categorical opposition of hijab practices to the
national-legal culture of French laicite. The impact is multi-directional—
innovatively inflecting both Muslim identities with an insistence upon in-
clusion in French national culture on their own terms—and, conversely,
altering the potential modes of French national variations by way of the
presentation of religious particularity.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, the modern state consists of—and exerts itself by way of—
coercive power structures. And this reality must be vigilantly and persis-
tently illuminated, assessed, and subjected to critique. Where necessary, it
must be resisted. But the state is not a god. The democratic constitutional
state can be held accountable to the democratic ethos that it was con-
ceived to enable. States can be challenged. Potentially, they can be altered.
The interpretive and contestatory dimensions of human rights, and the
cross-cutting ambivalences of the nationalisms that states need and fre-
quently cultivate to transmute their monopoly upon the coercive use of
force into legitimated authority provide two dimensions through which
they may be held accountable, resisted, and subjected to change.
The case of Dogru v. France (along with other cases of ECHR Article
9 jurisprudence) makes clear that there can be no simple appeal to human
rights as a groundwork for religious freedom: not, at least, without
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analysis and critical interrogation of the social and cultural contexts
within which human rights are applied. In short, there will have to be
more than human rights casuistry, in which cases are subsumed under
principles, to defend religious freedom in contemporary Europe.
Of course, at the same time, power reductionism and genealogical de-
terminism that view the right to religious freedom as intrinsically defi-
cient and bound to be always and already an instrument colluding in the
very dynamics of power it purports to resist are, I have argued, equally
misguided. Such analyses are predicated upon an unnecessary and detri-
mental conflation of nation and state, which positions the two as cotermi-
nous. By contrast, recognizing the pliability, multi-valence, and internal
ambivalences of national identities and religious practices may illuminate
resources for resisting and correcting state power and, similarly, for con-
ceptualizing the constructive potential of human rights discourse and in-
stitutions. This account permits internal contestation that is multi-
directional, resulting in diversification—and even innovation—within na-
tional identities. In this context, human rights implements have served as
valuable instruments of resistance to injustice.
Reconceiving nationalism in this way means that human rights
implements and institutions are not fated to reflect the influence of a
nationalist interest that is subsumed within and subject to iron-clad de-
termination by the power interests and (putatively) ever-expanding regu-
latory capacities of the state (especially with regard to minority groups
internal to the state). Moreover, it becomes possible to recognize the state
as not simply an amorphous wielder of absolute power exercised in the
interest of protecting and perpetuating that power (e.g. the Leviathan’s ex-
pansion of its regulatory powers). State interests, institutions, and objectives
rely upon dimensions of nationalism for purposes of legitimation—as
means, for instance, by which state power may come to be perceived as le-
gitimate authority in the eyes of its citizenry. And yet, the multi-valence of
national identities means that state authority admits of internal ambiva-
lences and the potential to be contested and changed. Authoritative pur-
poses of a state might be critically illuminated and guarded against,
resisted, and redirected by its citizenry. The multi-valence and elasticity of
nationalisms provide one means for critique and resistance, and the inter-
pretive and contestatory character of human rights principles and adjudica-
tions provide another.
What would be entailed in repositioning human rights from abstract
universals to a tradition of discourse that is recognized as historically im-
manent, intrinsically interpretive and contestable, and thus, subject to the
interests, purposes, and background contexts in which they are invoked
and applied? I have argued that such repositioning means that illuminating,
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critically assessing, and responding to contextual particulars (e.g. politi-
cal, cultural, and religious motivations and background influences, among
others), and attending reflexively to ambivalences and tensions internal
to how rights principles are codified, articulated, interpreted, and applied
permit distinguishing between better and worse, right and wrong applica-
tions of rights norms.
Reframed in the above ways, human rights applications can be subject
to correction, revision, and enrichment by way of thick description, re-
flexive analysis, normative argument, and concrete practices of social and
political change. This opens an alternative to the argument that rights
norms (and the right to religious freedom in particular) should be termi-
nally suspect on the grounds that they are implements by which the state
asserts its ever-expanding regulatory capacities, that is, as tentacles of the
Leviathan.
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